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E\'I']X tile reader of Spinoza's litJilcs whose acquaintance with
I linchi thinkinj^- is sHght cannot fail to he struck hy the num-
ber of ])arallels hetween the princi])al tenets of both. 'J'he Latin of
the Ilthica is also similar to the Sanskrit in the philosojjhical por-
tions of the \'edic writings. The directness of both languages is
no less amazing than the sincerity and frankness with whicJT the
deepest thoughts are expressed.
Hindu philosophy had reached a height of insight when the be-
ginnings of western philosophy were, to all appearance, still lost in
speculations about the physical world. But the precocity of India
was followed by a long period of slumber, as it were, which con-
tinues almost down to the present. The schools that in later years
engaged in hot disputes all seem to be below the level which had
been attained long ago, while the principles set forth in Yedic times
stand unshaken in their Himalayan solitude. In the West there has
been a continrous efifort to build up idealistic systems, to keep them
intact and buttress them. The strong critical tendency character-
istic of the western attitude threatened to tear down the noblest
structures, the highest ideas, wdiereas in India debates were meant
only for raising the highest to yet loftier peaks. Eternal truths one
left untouched in their original formulation with a piety known onlv
to Orientals.
The short, archaic ])hrases and definitions of the L'jianishads
and cognate literature, which we here make the basis of our com-
parison, are still the living heritage of India, and the forms which
their highest speculations assumed are even now, after so manv
centuries, considered ader|uate and concise. Tlie\" may be looked
upon as Propositions reduced to the lowest terms for mnemonic
purposes and, thus, in more than one way si\ggest a comparison with
Spinoza's geometrical treatment of philosophy.
Any explanation of the parallelism on the basis of a direct con-
nection between the cabalistic tradition in Hebraism, to whose in-
fluence Spinoza was doubtless verv receptive, with an Oriental com-
plex of philosophic ideas to which India may have contributed, must
be more than precarious. Tlie historic continin'tv is lacking, and
there are other elements that tend to frustrate anv such attempt.
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The possibility of such a transmission, of course, remains. But from
another angle the parallelism appears in a most interesting light as
being grounded in the nature of thought itself. If philosophy is the
endeavor to describe adequately reality and has, as such, any ob-
jective value at all, identical points of view must lead to identical
results in the formulation of their findings. Time has nothing to do
with truth, if there is any absolute truth, while language is but an
accident and does not influence substantially the meaning it wishes
to convey. With such an interpretation we shall find it not difficult
to compare the Spinozistic philosophical ideas and ideals with their
Indian prototypes.
God is the ultimate for Spinoza, brahman that for the Hindus.
Both are substances, in Spinoza's sense. Prop. 7, Part I reads
:
"Existence belongs to the nature of substance." God, thus, exists
from all eternity, being the principle of all that is. The Brhadaran-
yaka Upanishad says : "Truly, this world was brahman in the be-
ginning" (1. 4. 10). This is not to be understood as implying that
it became something difiE^rent later. "In the beginning" means in
principle. In other words, brahman exists as world-ground from all
eternity. At one time, Spinoza made use of the Scholastic term
causa essendi, implying that God is the cause and existence of all
things (Cor. to Prop. 24, Pt. I). This states excellently the Indian
position.
Substance is infinite (Prop. 8, Pt. I), and from its nature fol-
lows an infinity of things in infinite modes (Prop. 16). The attri-
butes of God, like everything that expresses the infinite substance,
are infinite. Man knows of the infinite attributes of God only these
two ; extension and thought. God being all in Spinoza as well as in
the Brahmanical philosophy we would expect in the latter similar
indications as to the nature of this world. Indeed, one of the com-
monest attributes of brahman is that it is endless, ananfa, that is,
limitless, infinite. The negation of all spacial limitation, as we
meet it in Maitri Up. 6. 17, can mean nothing else but mathemati-
cal infinitude. In the Svetasvatara Up. 5. 13 the highest reality is
characterized as anddhyananfam, without beginning and without
end. When Gautama Aruni went to Jaibali to receive instruction
in the highest metaphysical knowledge and the latter was not im-
mediately disposed to give it to him, he says: "It is well known that
I have a full share of gold, of cows and horses, of female slaves,
of rugs, of apparel. Be not tmgenerous toward me. Sir, in regard
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to that which is the abundant, the infinite, the unhniited" ( l'>rh. Up.
6. 2. 7, in II lime's translation). In other words, knowledge con-
cerning tile topic of the EfJiica was sought, and if the ensuing dis-
cussion is somewhat shrouded and runs along different lines, we
must make due allowance for the ritualistic background of the Upani-
shads. The im])ortant thing to note is that hrahman was conceived
by these early Hindus mrch in the same way as Spinoza conceived
his substance.
The infinity of attributes may be latent in another passage of
the same I'panishad where hrahman is spoken of as "tens and thous-
ands, many and endless" (2. 5. 19). At any rate, space and knowl-
edge share with hrahman the quality of ananta. Space, akasa, is
endless in Chandogya X'p. 1. 9. 2. The "great Being," which is just
a mass of intelligence (vljudnaghaua) , is infinite and limitless in
Brh. 2. 4. 12. Yajnavalkya. to whom the statement is ascribed, also
regarded mind (manas) as infinite (ib. 3. 1. 9).
\\'hat appears as well substantiated thought in S])inoza's sys-
tem we meet in the Upanishads as sim]:)le postulates. But as cer-
tain as deep reflection must have ]ireceded the almost aphoristic
I'panishadic sentences, so certain it is that the finest insights in
Spinoza's immortal book were not won bv deduction from the axi-
oms and definitions.
Practically every other characteristic of Sjiinoza's substance may
be paralleled by references to the I'pani shads. The 27th Proposition
asserts that Cod is constrained by nothing: he, therefore, is inde-
pendent in the fullest sense, an idea expressed in Sanskrit by manv
words, but especially by svatantra. which convevs complete self-
reliance, a term apparentlv much liked by the ^Nlaitri L'panishad.
Eternity, infinitinle as to time, or the absence of a when, before, and
after (Schol. 2 to Prop. ?>?t, V\. T) is particidarlv predicated in the
19th Proposition of God nnd his attributes, and it is also one of the
frequent adjectives in PTindu metaphysics. The words are nitya
and saiiatana, both in application to hrahman. Cause and effect do
not reach Cod. he is not and never has been implicated in this rela-
tion, having existed from all eternity unproduced. or unborn (aja),
as the Upanishads have it.
.\n echo of the eternal Acritv as which Sjiinoza designates the
existence as well as the essence of substance (Schol. 2 to Prop. 8
and Cor.'s 1 and 2 to Prop. 20. Pt. 1) mav be seen in that both,
being and truth, are predicated of or identified with hraJiman. That
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intense desire on the part of Spinoza to make God the most perfect
being which makes itself feU throughout the Ethics, is also seen in
every line of the Upanishads which deny every quality that may be
met in ordinary experience to brahman : it is iieti, neti, not this, not
that, so it may not be confused with anything in the perceptual
world. Brahiiiaii must be left in its grandeur and sublimitv. And.
likewise, Spinoza does not want to abandon himself to anything less
consummate. There is no need for him to describe God as beyond
good and evil. It follows from the utter transcendency of all that
appertains to him directly, and the same position is held by the In-
dian speculators. Good and evil are human notions formed after a
comparison of things with one another (see Ethica, preface to Pt.
4). The parallel Indian view in these matters has often enough been
commented upon and need not be reiterated here.
It would not concur with the facts if we interpreted Spinoza's
God as being pure mind. We would limit him thus decidedly. Never-
theless, he is the ultimate cause, the efficient cause of the existence
as well as essence of all things (Pt. I, Prop. 25 etc.). In addition,
he is thinking being, while, according to the most important seventh
Proposition of the second Part, his power to think is equal to his
virtual power to act. There is a double aspect which is also appar-
ent in later Hindu speculation, where the highest being "shines
forth" in and through the whole manifestation. The process of
creation itself is always described cautiously as a "shining forth"
(prakasa). This neutral term is chosen to indicate the subtleness
of the development which has 'both, an apparently logical and an
apparently physical aspect which mingle in the significant concept
iiidyd. To this also there are parallels in Spinoza. For the moment
we call attention only to the circumstance that the Western view
differs markedly from the Hindu one if some sort of a dualism is
read into it which Spinoza, however, never intended.
The whole creation is God's pleasure, and none of the motives
ascribed to God by theology can be predicated of him in the cre-
ation of the world. This is a typically Eastern view which, in Spi-
noza, reaches beyond the Hebraic idea of the absolute power of a
despot to that so generally held at all times in India, of Siva's dance
which conveys the utter inconceivability of any ultimate design in
creation. Man cannot fathom the purpose of the whole, and Spi-
noza does not hesitate to stigmatize all final causes as nothing more
than human fictions. No thinker ever was fiercer in criticizing an-
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thropomorpliic tendencies. A seeniinj^ exce])tion is the dcus sivc
uatiira, which is the perfect parallel to the Hindu use of the mascu-
line pronoun sa for the neuter demonstrative tat in application to
the ultimate reality. On both sides we look more in the direction
of tolerance than of compromise for an exjilanation. The pure "It,"
like the forbidding substance, is less satisfying and puts greater ob-
stacles in the way of a mystical realization, which neither the Hindus
nor Spinoza rebuked, brt rather invited, tacitly.
God. like brahman, is one. cka, without a second, advaita. In
a number of ways this is also given expression to throughout the
Ethics. The problem, however, is how can this One become the
many, how can the cka be this world-all, sarvam idam, or how are
the attributes related to the one and only substance. Here Spinoza's
answer varies somewhat from that of the Hindus. Spinoza lodges
the entire responsibility for the many in God himself from whose
omnipotence and infinite nature there follows, according to the 16th
Proposition of the first Part, an infinity of things in infinite modes,
while the infinity of attributes is, for him. contained already in the
definition of God as the absolute being. The Hindu has always in-
clined to the belief that the One is reality, the many appearance
;
but again. Eastern and Western thought approach each other, for
if hrahman is everything, the appearance or maya must be bound
up inextricably with brahman also—not that he too were maya, but
that the maya is his maya.
The metaphysical speculation of the Hindus turns around the
two poles of brahman and dtman, the human soul or self as the writ
small of brahman. Spinoza comes very close to such a conception
in the second and the two last parts of the Ethics. When the Upani-
shads are in search of what is abiding, eternal, they teach to find it
in the atman, which is identical with braiunan. The soul, in Spi-
noza's system, is eternal also, in so far as it is in essence identical
with God. and not in so far as it is the soul of a body having a cer-
tain duration. That is made plain in the Hindu view likewise where,
in order to convey the subtlety of atman, the pupil is made to realize
that neither the body nor what we would call the "me." can be the
atman that is eternal and may be regarded as connatural with brah-
man (cf., e.g.. Chand. Up. 8. 7 fif.).
Many are the adjectives applied to atman, and we need not be
surprised at finding them also in various places of the EfJiics, in-
asmuch as a fundamental conception in a metaphysical system in-
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evitablv admits conclusions with respect to its other characteristics.
So, that the sorl is not destroyed along with the body at death (Prop.
23, Pt. Y), which is paralleled by the Sanskrit aksara, meaning im-
perishable, in application to atman. The essence of atman is knowl-
edge, realization, Z'idyd, jnana, and thus is identical with brahman
by this intrinsic relationship. Similarly Spinoza says in the Corol-
lary to the 11th Proposition (Pt. TI), that the human soul is part
of the infinite intelligence of God. JNlan conceives through God,
and in conceiving and perceiving conceives and perceives nothing
but God again. ^loreover, inasfar as man so perceives and con-
ceives he has an adequate knowledge of God. The same holds good
of dfniaii and hrahinan which is said to be sarvam idani, the whole
world, as well as adhyatman, that is, Emerson's Oversoul.
The three kinds of knowledge distinguished by Spinoza in the
second Part of the Ethics we find also in the Upanishads. Opinion
or imagination, representing the first kind of knowledge, is wholly
inadequate. The term applied to such knowledge is man, which
means to opine and which is never used when the object involved
is the higher reality. As to the second kind of knowledge mediated
by reason, it is related to that of the third kind, intuition. They are
adeqrate. and z'idyd and judna are likewise fully satisfactory with
respect to brahman in any of its forms. The peculiar quality of un-
certainty, doubt, hesitation, and wavering is typical of opinion. Real
knowledge is positive and certain : as Spinoza says, certainty is not
a mere privation or absence of doubt. Truth is self-evident and pre-
cludes all doubt. "As the light makes manifest both itself and the
darkness, so does truth reveal both itself and that which is false"
(Schol. to 43rd Prop.). AA'ith equal depth and assurance the Upani-
shadic ya cvam veda, ''he who knows this," rings into our ears.
Truth is not an extrinsic correspondence between an idea and a
thing- : it is identical with itself.
P)Ut aside from these characteristics of knowledge there are
others which are exhibited with striking similarity by the Eastern
and Western thinkers. Plow often do we read in the Upanishads
of crossing the fearful stream of knowledge, or successfully reach-
ing the other shore which lies beyond darkness, or surmounting
sorrow ! Spinoza, too, tells us how truth, as true knowledge, dis-
pels the fear of error and uncertainty. Knowledge is a good, while
knowledge of God is the supreme good, according to Proposition
28 of Part TV. And a little farther down we read analogously to
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the Plindu desire for bralniun'idyd, knowledge of hralniuni, that the
highest happiness of those who ])racticc \irtue is to know ("lod
(Demon, to Prop. 36). The /;ra//;;/<;-knower is definitely heyond
evil in virtue of insight, and so S])inoza's ideal thinker has attained
the good in the luriitis vita in which nothing of evil may hefall him.
His rnderstanding protects him sufficiently and insures him acqui-
escence and contentment of mind, just as the Hindu sage enjoys
0)10)1(10, highest hliss and ha])piness.
Sj)inoza does not know the concept Didyo as such which has so
frequently heen interpreted as deception, delusion, and fraud, hut
w hich is in reality appearance or what we, philosophically speaking,
designate as phencnnenon. The idea, however, is latent in the first
kind of knowledge just alluded to, as well as in what Spinoza calls
the passion of the soul which ]:)roduces confused ideas. MdyCi, like
the passions, produces sorrow and sulYering and thus makes libera-
tion, moksa, highly desirable. Having gone that far, the Hindus and
S])inoza have to go one more step. They have to find means and
ways, not to salvation as such, which would be a religious problem,
but to peace of mind. It is obvious what Spinoza demands: reduc-
ing the number of inadequate ideas, or, what is equivalent to it. les-
sening the frequency of our passions and increasing true knowdedge.
In India practically the identical solutions have been found and
recommended for many centuries.
The Hindu sees kd))io, desire, at the root of sorrow and suffer-
ing. In Spinoza's terminology it is pain, grief, and melancholy. De-
sire, so our philosopher explains in the 57th Proposition (Pt. Ill),
is itself the very essence of passion. And here we perceive a slight
difference between the thinkers we are comparing, which resolves,
however, into a fine discrimination on the part of each of them. De-
sire is able to cause both, good and evil. As long as it is guided by
reason, it is productive of good. This is paralleled by the insistence
in the I panishads on restraint of the activity of the sensorv ap-
paratus. ^^^hat Spinoza calls ambition has its prototype in aJioiiikdra.
literally the I-maker, of the \'edic literat'-re. In his definition. Spi-
noza restricts ambition to immoderate desire of glory, while the
Hindus view the whole of individual existence as under the aspect
of a self-limiting process. But why is melancholy and sorrow evil?
Because they inhibit action, and the power of the bodv is lessened
and restrained (Demon, to Prop. 42, Pt. 4).
And thus we come to the goal of all philosophy which lies in
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attaining happiness, ananda. At the close of the second Part Spi-
noza admits that his doctrine confers entire peace of mind. Joy,
lactitia, is the object, and in attaining it we attain happiness at the
same time. Spinoza does not mean merely the affections of the body,
as laughing and the like, but the deeper joys of a spiritual life which
increase our power to act. The good is the action, joyous doing.
Gayety and cheerfulness (hilaritas) are always good, and there may
never be an excess of either. In fact, "the more joyfully we feel,
the higher is the state of perfection to which we pass,—in other
words, the more do we necessarily participate in the Divine nature"
(Schol. 2, Prop. 45, Pt. 4). There is no need of adducing examples
from Hindu literatrre to illustrate that the whole of Indian philos-
ophy is permeated by the desire to reach the state of boundless bliss.
What links Spinoza so closely to this eastern thought is that he,
more fearlessly than other philosophers, insisted that speculation
cannot be the end of philosophy, but that it is happiness which com-
municates itself from the mind to the whole of the personality.
What is especially significant is that Spinoza's, as the Hindu's, anan-
da depends on knowledge in the sense in which it has been explained
above. This is brought out especially in the 27th Proposition to
Part y. And as the Hindus define the highest reality, brahman,
in terms of bliss, so Spinoza says that beatitude is not the reward
of virtue, but is virtue itself. Happiness needs no justification, and
it needs no sacrifice. That action and a positive adjustment to life
constitute the source and end of happiness, is also the theme of
the Bhagavad Gita which among the religious books of India is most
popular.
It is the philosopher in whom the life of the spirit comes to ade-
qrate expression. Spinoza has left us a brief sketch in the Ethics
which mig-ht be taken as a sort of autobiography. In pointing to
some of the characteristics of his ideal philosopher it is hardly neces-
sary to parallel them one by one bv those predicated of the sai'n-
iiylsin, the Indian wise man. The one perfectly reflects the other.
.Spinozism teaches to hate no-one. to despise no-one, to ridicule no-
one, to be angry with no-one, to envy no-one (end of Pt. II), in
one word to preserve the Stoical calmness. Pity, partiality, and
srpcrstition are not marks of the wise man, but a life of reason
aufl thought and action in accordance with one's own nature, sva-
hlidva, in Sanskrit (cf. ib. and Schol. to Prop.'s 18 and 35 of Pt. IV).
The following sentence by Spinoza is the key that unlocks the un-
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derstanding to the ancient ideal, be it Eastern or Western, of the
wise man : "There is no single thing in nature more useful to man
than the man who lives according to the dictates of reason" (Cor.
1 to Prop. 35, Pt. IV). The old prejudice of the impracticality of
philosophy is thus dispelled. Contentment, peace of mind, contem-
plativeness, action, reason and, above all, balance throughout (for
which see Prop. 39 of Pt. IV) have a tangible effect not only on
the individual possessed of these, but on society as well.
It is important that Spinoza interpreted the attitude of the wise
man also religiously as piety (see Schol. to Prop. 37, Pt. 4) which
corresponds with the Indian conce]:)tion of hhakti, devotion, incul-
cated especially l)y the llhagavad CTtfi. The dictum, to live virtue
rather than to expunge evil (see end of Pt. IV), is at once Oriental
and modern. The man of reason, Spinoza says, should live in so-
ciety. This might be considered quite antagonistic to the Eastern
ideal ; only seemingly so, perhaps, for the wise man of the Upani-
shadic age, though he may be leaving his family and repairing to
the forest, is seen going from place to place, teaching and taking
part in philosophical discussions.
The Upanishads are emphatic in drawing a distinction between
knowledge, vidya, and ignorance, azndyd, the latter leading to disas-
trous consequences ; the Stoics divided mankind in wise men and
fools ; Spinoza, likewise, stresses more than once that the wise great-
ly excel the ignorant. And thus, while there are a few points on
which Spinoza disagrees with the Eastern thinkers, it is in the fun-
damental conceptions that he agrees with them. The fact that Spi-
noza, by race, belonged to an Oriental people accounts for many
similarities in the temperamental and intellectual disposition. But
what is of far greater practical significance is, that there are con-
ceptions which are above time and place and circumstance, and
that they are voiced with undaunted and autochthonic vigor in Orient
and Occident alike, at different stages of the history of mankind and
in various tongues.
